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Estimating the Public Value of Conflicting
Information: The Case of Genetically
Modified Foods
Matthew C. Rousu, Wallace E. Huffman, Jason F. Shogren,
and Abebayehu Tegene
ABSTRACT. Environmental groups have be- food products other than those that nor-
come the chief antagonists toward agricultural bio- mally carry allergens (See Friends of the
technology innovations. They demonstrateand dis- Earth 2001; Greenpeace International 2001).
seminate private information with the objective of Through press releases, web sites, and pro-changing the behavior of consumers and produc-
tests, environmental groups have been suc-ers. We use experimental auctions with adult U.S.
cessful at publicizing their negative viewsconsumers and show that this information reduces
on GM foods and affecting consumers’ andsignificantly the demand for genetically modified
(GM)-food products and that it has significant producers’ behavior.2
public good value—an average of 3 cents per prod- Environmental groups share the costs
uct purchased, or roughly $2 billion annually. We of producing negative GM information.3
also show that the dissemination of independent Their members benefit collectively fromthird-party information about agricultural biotech-
reductions in demand for GM productsnology dissipates most of the public good value of
that result from this information. Becausenegative GM-product information. (JEL D83,
Q18) the negative information and outcomes are
not specifically excluded from nonenviron-
I. INTRODUCTION mental groups in society, they may also
benefit (or harm) others, and this is the
Some people hail the use of biotechnol- sense in which the information has poten-
ogy to create genetically modified (GM) tial public good attributes across groups in
products as a major new revolution in society (Cornes and Sandler 1996; An-
product innova tion.1 However, not every- dreoni 1990) . If those not in environmental
one views these products favorably. Envi- groups could be effectively excluded from
ronmental groups like Greenpeace and
Friends of the Earth have become the main
antagonists against the use of genetic engi-
The authors are, respectively, research economist at
neering for development of new products. RTI International;Charles F. Curtiss D istinguished Pro-
They demonstrate and disseminate infor- fessor, Department of Economics, Iowa State Univer-
sity; Stroock Distinguished Professor of Natural Re-mation, representing their self-interest,
source Conservation and Management, Department ofwith the goal of affecting consumers’ (and
Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming; andpossibly producers’) behavior . Greenpeace, senior economist, Food and Rural Economics Divi-
for example, claims that the unknown ef- sion, USDA.
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the benefits, the negative information would
be a club good to the environmental group
(Cornes and Sandler 1996) .4
In this paper, we postu late that negative
GM information supplied by an environ-
mental group has public good value. We
estimate this public good value through the
eyes of an environmental group member by
quantifying the “perceived public good”
value to consumers who participated in ex-
FIGURE 1perimental laboratory auctions. The per-
The Four Informa t ion Tr ea tmen t s Given t oceived value (henceforth public good
Par t icipan t svalue) is obtained from individua ls who
changed their behavior after receiving in-
formation from environmental groups.
Our results lead to two conclusions. if a third party produced and disseminated
First, a relatively large public good value verifiable, independent information on ge-
exists for negative GM information— netic modification, the public good value
about 3 cents per product purchased per of negative information would decrease
consumer or $2 billion nationally. Second, dramatically—to less than 1 cent per pur-
chased product per consumer.
1 As currently used, genetic modification has a spe-
cific and somewhat narrow meaning—the application II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
of the basic technique of recombinant DNA or gene-
splicing technology. The process is sometimes referred To examine the value of informationto as genetically engineered, genetically modified, or
from environmental groups, we use thebioengineered . Cohen and Boyer discovered the tech-
nique of recombinant DNA in 1973, and were awarded data from the experimental auctions de-
a patent on gene splicing technology in 1980. This tech- scribed in Rousu et al. (2002) . These exper-
nology facilitates the transfer of genes across species. iments were designed using an array ofIt built on the 1953 discovery by Watson and Crick of
experimental methods developed by Smiththe structure of DNA and of their suggestion about how
it replicates. (1976) , including the “induced valuation
2 These groups have also influenced legislation. The method,” where auction participants re-
European Union, where the anti-GM lobby is relatively ceive monetary rewards for making goodstrong (Hayes et al. 1995), enacted a moratorium on
decisions. In our design, three types of in-new GM foods in April 1998. In addition, those GM
foods approved for consumption now must be labeled formation about GM and biotechnology
“genetically modified.” Environmental groups have also were defined (1) the industry perspec-
helped influence other countries like Japan, Australia, tive—provided by a group of leading bio-and New Zealand (Rousu and Huffman 2001) to enact
technology companies, including Mon-mandatory labeling of GM foods.
3 There is a fixed cost to the initial preparation, but santo and Syngenta; (2) the environmental
the Internet has made the marginal cost of distribution group perspective—from Greenpeace, a
essentially zero. leading environmental group or biotech4 Ambiguity exists over whether information from
antagonist s; and (3) the third-party, verifi-environmental groups should formally be defined as a
public good or a club good. A club good, as defined in able perspective—from a neutral third-
Sandler and Tschirhart (1980), is a “voluntary group party group of scientists, professionals, re-
deriving mutual benefit from sharing one or more of ligious leaders, and academics, none with
the following: production costs, the members’ character-
a financial stake in GM foods. For thisistics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits.”
study, the information was organized intoEnvironmental groups share the production costs of
information—so one might consider their information four treatments that are summarized in
to be a club good. Their information is disseminated to Figure 1. A participant could receive the
nonmembers, and there is limited exclusion to those
following: (1) only pro-biotechnology in-who are not environmental group members, which is
why we call this information an impure public good. formation, (2) both pro- and anti-biotech-
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nology information, (3) both pro-biotech- will lead to a loss. Participants were given
nology and verifiable (third-party) infor- detailed instructions on the random nth
mation, or (4) pro-biotechnology, anti- price auction, including an example writ-
biotechnology, and verifiable (third-party) ten on the board. A fter the participants
information. These four information treat- learned about the auction, a short quiz was
ments, each with two replications, were given to ensure that everyone understood
randomly assigned to eight experimental how the auction worked.
units, each containing 13 to 16 participants. Step 3 was the first practice round of
The data collected from participants in the bidding, where participants bid on a brand-
experiment provide a unique data set that name candy bar. The participants were
allows us to examine how consumer behav- asked to examine the product and then
ior towards GM food changed when infor- place a (sealed) bid on the candy bar. The
mation from environmental groups is in- bids were collected and the first round of
troduced . practice bidding was over. Throughou t the
The experiment can be summarized in auction, when the participants were bid-
ten steps.5When participants arrived at the ding on items in a particular round, they
lab, they signed consent forms agreeing had no indication of what other items they
to participate in the auction. After they may be bidding on in future rounds or if
signed the forms, they were given $40 for additional rounds would occur.
participating and an ID number to use in Step 4 was the second practice round of
order to preserve their anonymity. The bidding. In this round , the participants bid
participants then read a brief set of instruc- separately on three different items. The
tions and filled out a questionnaire. three products were the same brand-name
Step 2 introduced the auction . We used candy bar, a deck of playing cards, and a
a random nth price auction in this experi- box of pens. The consumers were asked
ment (Shogren et al. 2001) . The advantages to examine the three products in practice
of the random nth price auction are that round two and make bids on the products.
it is demand revealing in theory and the Then the bids were collected. Only oneauction attempts to engage bidders at all of the two rounds was chosen as bindinglocations along the demand curve.6 The (valid), so that participants would not takerandom nth price works as follows: each home more than one of any product. Theof k bidders submits a bid for one unit of a reason was to eliminate price reductiongood ; then each of the bids is rank-ordered
due to the consumer buying a larger quan-from highest to lowest. The auction moni-
tity because of diminishing marginal utilitytor then selects a random number that is
of these products (i.e., lower prices duedrawn from a uniform distribution be-
to a consumer’s negatively sloped demandtween 2 and k , and the monitor sells one
curve). Participants were informed thatunit of the good to each of the (n – 1)
only one of the two rounds would bindhighest bidders at the nth price. For in-
before Step 3 and were reminded of thisstance, if the monitor randomly selects n 5
again before Step 4.5, the four highest bidders each purchase
A fter the two practice auction roundsone unit of the good priced at the fifth-
were completed, the binding round and thehighest bid. Ex ante, bidders who have low
binding nth prices were revealed in Stepor moderate valuations now have a non-
5. All of the bids were written on the black-trivial chance to buy the good because the
board, and the nth prices were circled forprice is determined randomly. This auction
each of the three products. Participantsincreases the odds that insincere bidding
could see immediately what items they
won and the market-clearing price. The
5 The complete set of information given to partici- participants were notified that all pur-
pants is available upon request from the authors.
chases of goods would take place after the6 For a more detailed description of the benefits of
the random nth-price auction (see Shogren et al. 2001). experiment was over, so that all exchanges
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of money for goods would take place at Two auction rounds followed the distri-
the end of the session. bution of information. One of the two
In Step 6, information about biotechnol- rounds had the participants bid on three
ogy was released to the participants. The food products with just a standard food
possible types of information a participant label.9 The other round had participants
could receive were as follows: (1) the in- bid on the same food products with the
dustry perspective—a collection of state- same label, except there was a sentence
ments and information on genetic modifi- added indicating that the food had been
cation provided by a group of leading genetically engineered. We used three dif-
biotechnology companies, including Mon- ferent food products: vegetable oil (made
santo and Syngenta; (2) the environmental from soybeans), tortilla chips (made from
group perspective—a collection of state- yellow corn), and russet potatoes. These
ments and information on genetic modifi- products were chosen because both GM
cation from Greenpeace, a leading envi- and non-GM versions of these products
ronmental group; and (3) the third-party, were obtainable; they are neither strong
verifiable perspective—a statement on ge- complements nor substitutes, so an in-
netic modification approved by a third- crease in the probability of purchasing one
party group, consisting of a variety of indi- product should have little or no effect on
viduals knowledgeable about GM goods, bids for the other products; having three
including scientists, professionals, religious products ensures that, if a consumer has
leaders, and academics, none of whom have no demand for one or two products, we
a significant financial stake in GM foods. can still get information on his/her prefer-
To help the participants understand these ence for genetic modification on the otherdifferent sources of information, the vol- item(s); and these products have differentume of information released of each type properties, as it is plausible that consumerswas limited to one 8 1/2” 3 11” page, and
would view genetic modification differentlyit was organized into five categories—
with respect to these different products.general information, scientific impact, hu-
The labels for these products were mademan impact, financial impact, and environ-
as plain as possible to avoid any influencemental impact—to ease the information
on the bids from the label design. The se-processing load on participants. The exact
quencing of GM labels was randomizedsheets given to participants are available
across experimental units. Each combina-in Rousu et al. (2002) or from the authors
tion of information was given to two exper-on request.
imental units, that is, two replications. OneThe information was randomized to cre-
of these experimental units bid on foodate four treatments of information combina-
with the standard label in round one andtions: pro-biotechnology information; both
on food with the label indicating geneticpro- and anti-biotechnology information;7
modification in round two. The other ex-pro-biotechnology and third-party, verifi-
perimental unit bid on food with the labelable information;8 and pro-biotechnology,
indicating genetic modification in roundanti-biotechnology, and third-party, verifi-
one and on food with the standard labelable information. These four combinations
were randomized among all eight experi- in round two. For each experimental unit ,
mental units, with each information combi- only one of the two food rounds was cho-
nation going to two experimental units. sen as the binding round. This avoided the
problem of bid prices being reduced as
consumers moved along their demand7 When a participant received both pro-biotechnol-
curve.ogy and anti-biotechnology information, the order was
randomized so that some participants received the pro-
biotechnology information first, and others received the
9 The exact labels are available for viewing in Rousuanti-biotechnology information first.
8 When third-party information was distributed, it et al. (2002) or are available from the authors upon
request.always was distributed after the other information types.
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In Step 7, participants bid on three dif- jects with a food item and then ask them
to “upgrade” to another food item; ratherferent food products: a bag of potatoes, a
bottle of vegetable oil, and a bag of tortilla participants are paid $40 and then bid on
different foods in only two trials. Thischips. The participants were instructed to
examine the three products and then write avoids the risk of an in-kind endowment
effect or an increase in valuation to andown their (sealed) bid for each of the
three goods. Participants bid on each good individual that occurs when he/she is given
a product. This effect is reflected in anseparately. Then the bids were collected
from the individuals, and the participants individual’s willingness to pay for a partic-
ular good being significantly less than his/were informed that they were about to
look at another group of food items. her willingness to accept, given the endow-
ment. An endowment effect is of concernStep 8 had participants examine the
same three food products, but with the dif- because it might distort a participant’s bid-
ding behavior (e.g., Lusk and Shroederferent labels (the second trial). A fter the
participants examined the products, they 2002 or Corrigan and Rousu 2003) . In addi-
tion, by paying each person a $40 participa-were instructed to bid on the three prod-
ucts. Each good was bid on separately. The tion fee we virtually eliminate the possibil-
ity that someone will not have adequatebids were then collected from all of the
participants. Once again, before Step 7, resources to place a bid on a product (i.e.,
we eliminate the credit constraint). Third,consumers were informed that only one of
the two trials or bidding rounds would bind we randomly assigned treatments to the ex-
perimental units, so estimating the treatmentand they were told this again before Step 8.
In Step 9, we selected which of the two effect is simply the difference in means
across treatments (see Wooldridge 2002).trials would be chosen as binding, along
with the binding nth prices. After the bind- Fourth, we use adult consumers over 18
years of age from two different midwesterning round and binding nth prices were re-
vealed, the winners were notified, and the metropolitan areas that were chosen using
a random digit dialing method. Table 1participants were asked to complete a brief
post-auction questionnaire. In Step 10, the summarizes their demographic character-
istics. The demographics of our sample doparticipants who did not win any products
were informed that theywere free to leave, not perfectly match the U.S. census demo-
graphic characteristics for these regionsand the participants who won products ex-
changed money for their goods, and then (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) , but they are
similar and provide a sufficient representa-they were free to leave.
Although our experimental design fol- tion for our initial probe into labeling and
information for GM products. In addit ion,lows standard procedures (e.g., Shogren et
al. [1994]) , we made several refinements we use common food items that are avail-
able to shoppe rs in grocery stores and su-to better reflect consumer purchases. First,
subjects submitted only one bid per prod- permarkets. Furthermore, we use adults
rather than students to better reflect a typi-uct to avoid any question of creating affili-
ated values. Affiliation exists when the bid cal household of consumers. Although sev-
eral studies have used college undergradu-of a high-value bidder signals commonly
perceived, but unknown, characteristics of ates in laboratory auctions of food items
(Lusk et al. 2001; Hayes et al. 1995) , theya product, which increases the odds that
other bidders will also put a high value on are not the best choice for participants
when the items being auctioned are onesthe good (see Milgrom and Weber [1982]) .
In effect, independent private values are sold in grocery stores or supermarkets.
U sing a national random sample of gro-transformed into affiliated values, which
can affect the demand-revealing nature of cery store shoppers, Katsara et al. (2001)
showed that the share of college-age (18the Vickrey-style random nth-price auc-
tion (see, for example, List and Shogren, to 24) shoppers falls far below their share
in the popula tion (8.5% of shoppers versus[1999]) . Second, we do not endow our sub-
130 February 2004Land Economics
TABLE 1
Char act er ist ics of t he Auct ion Pa r t icipan t s (n 5 114)
Variable De nition Mean St. Dev
Gender 1 if female 0.61 0.49
Age Participant’s agea 51.1 17.1
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.69 0.46
Education Years of schooling 14.67 2.30
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.64 1.68
Income Household income level (in thousands)b 57.6 32.2
White 1 if participant is white 0.93 0.26
Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.01 0.01
1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.13 0.34
1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.37 0.48
1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.18 0.39
Informed 1 if an individual considered themselves at least somewhat 0.45 0.50
informed regarding genetically modi ed foods
a The median age of participants is 54 years old.
b The median income of participants is $55,000.
12.8% in the U.S. Census of Population). off.10 Second, assuming consumers max-
imize their utility subject to a budget con-College students obtain a large share of
straint, one computes the expendituretheir food from school cafeterias and a
function when the consumer has and doessmall share from grocery stores and super-
not have the new information. Third, oncemarkets compared to older shoppers (Carl-
the new information is provided, if a con-son, Kinsey, and Nadav 1998). Although
sumer’s purchases do not change, the in-our participants are slightly skewed toward
formation is treated as having no value—women, Katsara et al. (2001) showed that
clearly a lower-bound estimate. If the con-women make up a disproportional share of
sumer purchases a different bundle , he/shegrocery store shoppers (83% of shoppe rs
is presumed to be better off with the newversus 52% in the U.S. Census of Popula-
information. Conceptually, the value of in-tion). A sample primarily of grocery store
formation is the difference in the expendi-shoppers also weakens the sometimes-
ture function for a given utility with andstated need for having students participate
without new information. This occurs be-in several rounds of bidding to stabilize
cause, if a consumer changes his/her behav-bids for food items. We also minimize
ior after receiving the new information, thisHawthorne effects in bidding, that is, an
information allowed him/her to make “bet-individual’s behavior changes because they
ter” purchasing decisions and spend lessparticipate in an experiment with a particu-
money to reach any given level of utility.11lar objective (see Melton et al. 1996).
Formally, information from environmen-
tal groups causes some consumers to switch
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
10 This concept is similar to the concept behind theFollowing Foster and Just (1989), we de-
LaChatelier Principle. With more information, one has
termine the public value of information in the opportunity to adjust his/her behavior to an optimal
three steps (also see Rousu et al. 2002; Teisl, purchasing bundle. Consumers can maintain the status
quo or change, and they cannot be made worse off.Bockstael, and Levy 2001). First, introducing
11 Other procedures could be used to obtain an esti-new information does not change the situa-
mate of the value of information. D ifferent methods
tion, only the consumer’s knowledge. More might lead to different results, but we believe that our
approach leads to one plausible and defensible estimate.information cannot make consumers worse
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SUMVAL 5 o
j[ switched
PREMGAIN jplain-labeled. [4]from GM-labeled to plain-labeled foods be-
cause they realize they receive higher surplus
from consuming plain-labeled foods than To determine the average value of infor-they receive from consuming GM-labeled mation from environmental groups to afoods:12 consumer who switched from GM-labeled
to plain-labeled foods, we divide the total
surplusjplain-labeled 5 WTP jplain-labeled 2 P jplain-labeled [1] value of information by the number of con-
sumers who switched purchases:
surplusjlabeled 5 WTP jlabeled 2 P jlabeled [2] switchervalue 5
SUMVAL
Nbuy 2 switchedproduct
. [5]
The value of information to each person
We obtain the average value of informa-who switches is estimated by the difference
tion per consumer by dividing the totalin consumer surplus between the plain-
value of information by the total numberlabeled and GM-labeled foods:13
of consumers:
PREMGAIN jplain-labeled 5 surplusjplain-labeled 2 P jlabeled
[3] valueperson 5
SUMVAL
Npop
. [6]
All consumers who purchased plain-labeled
We apply this framework to our experi-foods obtain the premium as defined in
mental auction data to calculate the per-equation [3]. But, this premium only repre-
centage of consumers who switch to plain-sents increased welfare (i.e., the public-
labeled foods in two information settings:good value of information) for consumers
those consumers initially receiving posit ivewho switched to plain-labeled foods from
information or those consumers initiallyGM-labeled foods after receiving informa-
receiving both positive and verifiable in-tion from environmental groups.14
formation. We then compute the averageThe aggregate value of information is
public-good value of information from en-the sum of the value of information for all
vironmental groups per consumer whoindividua ls who changed their purchases
switches for each product. Finally, we esti-because of the information from environ-
mate the average public-good value of in-mental groups:
formation from environmental groups per
consumer in the popu lation for each prod-
uct. We suggest that these procedures pro-12 Prices for the GM-labeled and plain-labeled foods
are assumed to be the mean bid prices from the auction. vide a lower-bound estimate of the value
13 If consumer j ate GM-labeled foods before receiv- of information.
ing environmental information, he/she perceived
surplusjlabeled . surplusjplain-labeled and thus consumed GM-
labeled foods. If after receiving information from envi- IV. RESULTS
ronmental groups, consumer j switches to plain-labeled
foods, his/her perception of the surplus changes such The percentage of participants who pur-that surplusjlabeled , surplusjplain-labeled. The difference in sur-
chased GM-labeled foods both with andplus represents the change in consumer j’s welfare—the
value of information from environmental groups. This without information from environmental
does not imply the consumer assigns no weight to past groups are reported in Table 2. Part A
information, or views previously received information
shows the percentage of consumers whoas worthless. It reflects the idea that new information
bought GM foods when they initially re-may change consumers’ prior perceptions of the surplus
they receive from various products. ceived only the industry perspective. Part
14Our experimental auction data allow us to estimate B shows the percentage of consumers who
the percentage of consumers who switch from GM-la-
bought GM-labeled foods when they ini-beled to plain-labeled foods because of the information
from environmental groups. tially received information from biotech-
132 February 2004Land Economics
TABLE 2
The Per cen t age of Pa r t icipan t s Who Pu r chase GM-Label ed Foods wit h and
wit hout In for ma t ion f r om Envir onmen t a l Gr oups
Part A—Participants who originally received information only from agribusiness companies
Percentage Who buy Percentage Who Buy
GM-Labeled without GM-Labeled with
Information from Information from Percentage
Environmental Groups Environmental Groups Difference
Tortilla Chips 83.3 73.9 9.4
Vegetable O il 76.9 58.3 18.6
Potatoes 85.2 57.7 27.5
Part B—Participants who originally received information from both agribusiness companies and an independent,
third-party group
Percentage Who Buy Percentage Who Buy
GM-Labeled without GM-Labeled with
Information from Information from Percentage
Environmental Groups Environmental Groups Difference
Tortilla Chips 80.0 82.6 2 2.6
Vegetable Oil 92.3 73.9 19.4
Potatoes 88.5 79.2 9.3
nology companies and the third-party ceived new environmental group informa-
tion; the average public value per personsources. Our results show that a smaller
who switched is 15 cents per bag; and thepercentage of consumers purchase GM-
average public good value is 4 cents perlabeled foods when they receive GM-
bag. On average, the mean public-goodinformation from environmental groups.
value of information from environmentalThe public-good value of information
groups is approximately 3 to 4 cents perfrom environmental groups is reported in
person per purchased product that is po-Table 3. Part A reports the value to con-
tentially GM.15sumers who initially received industry in-
Part B of Table 3 shows the value offormation on agricultural biotechnology
environmental group information for con-only. For tortilla chips, almost 10% of par-
sumers who initially received both biotech-ticipants changed their purchase to plain-
nology industry and third-party information.labeled food products from GM-labeled
Here the value of environmental informa-ones after receiving the environmental
tion is significantly lower—averaging lessgroup information on agricultural biotech-
than half of a cent for tortilla chips andnology. The average public value of infor-
potatoes and about 2 cents for vegetablemation to each consumer who switched
oil. Across the three commodities, infor-purchases is 18 cents per bag, and the aver-
mation from environmental groups isage public value to each consumer in soci-
worth on average less than 1 cent per per-ety is 1.7 cents per bag. For vegetable oil,
environmental group information caused
over 18% of consumers to switch, with an 15Recall we established market prices to obtain these
values, and we used the sample mean bids as the marketaverage value of almost 38 cents per bottle
price. Using alternative market prices, one with a higherper person who switched. The average
premium and one with a lower premium for plain-labeledpublic value is 7 cents per bottle per person foods, we find the average value is approximately 3 cents
in society. For GM-labeled potatoes, 27% and 4 cents, respectively. The values appear robust to
assumptions about market prices.of participants switched when they re-
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TABLE 3
The Publ ic Good Va l ue of Informa t ion fr om Envir onment al Gr oups
Part A—Value for participants who initially receive positive information
Percentage
Who Switch Value Average Value
from GM Per Switcher Per Person
Tortilla Chips 9.4 $0.180/bag $0.017/bag
Vegetable O il 18.6 $0.378/bottle $0.070/bottle
Potatoes 27.5 $0.151/bag $0.041/bag
Part B—Value for participants who receive both positive and third party information
Percentage
Who Switch Value Average Value
from GMa Per Switcher Per Person
Tortilla Chips 2 2.6 $0.002/bag $0.000/bag
Vegetable O il 19.4 $0.132/bottle $0.024/bottle
Potatoes 9.3 $0.032/bag $0.003/bag
a In the market with both positive and third-party information, adding information from environmen-
tal groups caused some people to switch to GM-labeled tortilla chips. More participants purchased
the plain-labeled varieties of the vegetable oil and the potatoes when environmental information
was provided.
son per product. Hence, the value of infor- value of negative GM information would
be roughly $2 billion annually for U.S. con-mation from environmental groups is con-
sumers.16 Although large, the aggregatesiderably lower when participants initially
value does not seem unrealistic.17 The av-received information from both agribusi-
ness companies and third-party groups.
This result suggest s that consumers who 16 We obtain this value by first taking the smaller
received third-party information on ag- value of 3 cents per product for those who did not receive
third-party information on agricultural biotechnology.ricultural biotechnology gave less weight
Because the prices for these products range betweento environmental group information, which
$1.50 and $2.50, verifiable information has a value ofdecreased its public-good value to the GM about 1.5% of the purchase price. Second, using a lower
antagonists. estimate that only one-third of all foods contain some
GM material and U.S. citizens spent $390 billion for
food at home in 1997 (Putnum and Allshouse 1999),V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Americans spent roughly $130 billion on foods that
could be GM. The aggregate public value of environ-
Our results suggest that negative GM- mental information is roughly $1.95 billion annually in
the United States.product information supplied by environ-
17 One could argue that this estimate underestimatesmental groups can significantly reduce
the value for two reasons. First, we presume participants
consumer demand for GM products, and who did not change their habit of consuming GM prod-
the public-good value of this information ucts obtain no public-good value from information from
environmental groups. This is a conservative assumptionfrom environmental groups was about 3
because some participants may feel better about theircents for each of the three products pur-
consumption decision when it is informed by material
chased by the consumers in our sample. If from environmental groups, relative to their prefer-
we were to take the bold step and aggre- ences. Second, we are considering the aggregate value
from U.S. consumers only. However, this informationgate these findings to the national level, we
would also be freely available to consumers in foreignwould obtain the following result. A ssume
countries who make up 19/20 of the world population,
the anti-biotechnology information reached which implies additional aggregate public-good value
for negative GM information.every person in the United States, then the
134 February 2004Land Economics
erage value would be about $7.00 per year ers in two midwestern U.S. cities (not a
hotbed of environmental group activity),per person, which is considerably less than
Foster and Just’s value of information for it would be instructive to test consumer re-
actions in other regions of the Unitedcontaminated milk of $10.00 per month per
person (or $120.00 per year). We have also States. In addition, because some groups
(e.g., agribusinesses) view information fromshown that the distribution of independent
third-party information dissipates most of environmental groups as a cost it would
also be useful to determine the “cost” ofthe public good benefit of negative GM-
product information. Because the experi- information from environmental groups to
these parties.mental data were obtained from consum-
APPENDIX A
Demogr aphic Char act er ist ics of Pol k Count y, Iowa , incl uding Des Moines ar ea, and Ramsey
Count y, Minnesot a , incl ud ing St . Paul ar ea
Variable De nition Polk Ramsey Average
Gender 1 if female 0.52 0.52 0.52
Age Median age 45.7 45.7 45.7
Married 1 if the individual is marrieda 59.5 51.4 55.5
Education Years of schoolingb 13.52 13.76 13.64
Income Median household income level (in thousands) 46.1 45.7 45.9
White 1 if participant is white 0.9 0.8 0.85
Note:All variables are for individuals of all ages, except for married, which is for individuals 18 or older; education, which is for
individuals 25 or older; and age, which is for individuals 20 or older.
a The estimate of the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking the number of people married over
15 and assuming that the number of people were married at ages 15, 16, and 17 were zero—this gives the percentage of people who
are married who are 18 or older.
b The years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not completed 9th grade, 10.5 for those who
have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed high school but have had no college, 13.5 for those with some
college but no degree, 14 for those with an associate’s degree, 16 for those with a bachelor’s degree, and 18 for those with a graduate
or professional degree.
Andreoni 1990 3 Lusk and Shroeder 2002 9
Carlson et al. 1998 10 Lusk et al. 2001 10
Cornes and Sandler 1996 3 Melton et al. 1996 11
Corrigan and Rousu 2003 9 Milgrom and Weber 1982 9
Foster and Just 1989 11 Rousu et al. 2002 4,7
Friends of the Earth 2001 3 Rousu et al. 2002 11
Greenpeace International 2001 3 Shogren et al. 1994 9
Hayes et al. 1995 10 Shogren et al. 2001 5
Katsara et al. 2001 10 Teisl et al. 2001 11
List and Shogren, 1999 9 Wooldridge 2002 10
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